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After four years of negotiations, Moldova signed an Association Agreement (AA) including a Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) Agreement with the European Union (EU) on 27 June 2014. Ratified in the Moldovan
Parliament on 2 July 2014 it came into provisional application on 1 September 2014.
While this development represents an important milestone in Moldova's relations with the EU, the journey has not been
easy. Negotiations were difficult and internal politics turbulent with three government crises during the process.
Neighbouring Ukraine, Moldova has also come under pressure from Russia, including a ban on imports of Moldovan
wine in 2013 and, in the aftermath of the AA's ratification, on fruit and meat products. Despite Russia's bullying,
Moldova has remained focused on its goal of becoming a full EU member, although no such perspective is currently 
on offer. Yet the road ahead remains tough. Moldovan society is far from united on European integration; the ruling 
pro-European Coalition, remains fragile and prone to infighting, and Russia is poised to meddle further. Concern is
growing as security and stability in the region has deteriorated following Russian's invasion of Ukraine. The result of the
forthcoming 30 November parliamentary elections is crucially important, as a return to power of the current coalition is
far from guaranteed. 
BACKGROUND
Best known as Europe's poorest country, Moldova has come a long way. It is the fastest-reforming country on Europe's
eastern border, frequently touted at the champion of Eastern Partnership (EaP). Since the current government came to
power in 2009 there have been many positive developments. Politics have become more pluralistic and the country has
experienced slow but steady economic growth with GDP growing in the first semester of 2014 by 3.9%. Important
political and economic reforms have taken place, along with improvements to key infrastructure. Steps aimed at
improving the business climate have taken Moldova from 98th position to 78th in the World Banks Ease of Doing
Business Index. In order to obtain visa liberalisation with the EU, the government had to carry out far reaching reform of
the police service and Moldova is still the only member of the EaP to forbid discrimination by sexual orientation in line
with the new "Law on Enforcement of Equality," despite resistance from the Church and leftist forces. Today Moldova is
the only EaP state to have achieved a visa free regime with the EU.
Yet reforms need to be completed and implemented. Governance structures need to be strengthened and problems over
their independence persist. The economy is still distorted by monopolies, constitutional reform, deep judicial reform,
and further efforts to fight corruption are crucial. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index placed
Moldova 102 out of 137 countries in 2013, one point lower than the previous year. The newly created National 
Anti-Corruption Centre and National integrity Council have not been as successful as expected. 
Carrying out unpopular reforms, failing to adequately fight corruption, bickering within the ruling coalition, which has in
the past brought decision-making to a standstill, and more recently Russia's sanctions, have cost the government
support. This has boosted the main opposition Communist Party of former President Vladimir Voronin, the most popular
party in the Moldova with some 37% support.
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Russia has taken steps to push back against what it views as an encroachment by the EU into its sphere of influence.
Moscow has significant leverage over Moldova in a number of areas including trade; energy; migrant workers; the
breakaway territory of Transnistria backed by Moscow; and the pro-Russian Autonomous region of Gagauzia. It has used
this leverage, along with an intensive 'information' campaign to try and re-rail the process by spreading nightmare
scenarios on what closer association with the EU means. Bans have been placed on a number of key exports to the
Russian market, while Moscow has threatened to cut off Moldova's gas, with the country until recently almost 100%
dependent on Gazprom; and denied work permits to some 20.000 Moldovans. Approximately half a million
Moldovans work in Russia either permanently or seasonally with remittances averaging €1.09 billion annually, 19% of
Moldova's entire GDP. The potential loss is some €31.1 million if they are unable to return for an entire year, which
could be catastrophic for living standards.
Furthermore, EU integration is far from being a national project. Recent polls show that only 35% of Moldovans support
EU integration while 38% favour Russia's Customs Union. This includes the population of Gagauzia, with which
Chisinau has a strained relationship, having spent years embroiled in a struggle over the degree of autonomy and
amount (and distribution) of funding the region should receive. 
STATE OF PLAY
The Gagauz headache
While a strong pro-Russian sentiment prevails, the Gagauz, which number some 160.000 are not ethnic Russians but
descendants of the Seljuk Turks. In a referendum on 2 February 2014, denounced as illegal by Chisinau, 98.4% of
Gagauz favoured Russia's Customs Union over the EU. This is not surprising given the lack of information about the EU.
They fear that European integration could lead to the possible unification of Moldova with Romania and that Russia
could also punish them with trade restrictions or cut off access to the labour market. So far Russia has exempted
Gagauzia from the wine and fruit ban and promised Gagauzia a preferential gas price. Gagauzia' s leader, Bascan
Mihail Formuzal, claims he was never consulted on Moldova's decision to sign the AA. Another Russian-backed
breakaway territory is the last thing that Moldova needs. Chisinau needs to take more steps to improve relations, as well
as making EU funded projects in the region more visible. Furthermore, the planned visit of Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan to Gagauzia as part of a visit to Moldova in the autumn is welcomed. Erdogan is expected to give a
strong message of support for Moldova and its territorial integrity. Over the years Turkey has contributed considerable
economic assistance and investment to Gagauzia and Erdogan is a popular figure. 
A fruit nightmare
Moldova's economy relies heavily on its agricultural exports. As soon as the AA/DCFTA was ratified, Russia banned
Moldovan meat and fruit "for health reasons". Shortly afterwards it cancelled it's Free Trade Agreement with Moldova
within the CIS, removing the 'zero duty' for 19 products. The EU is the biggest importer of Moldovan agricultural exports
(54%), followed by Russia. In 2013, Russia imported 43% ($988 million) of Moldova's agricultural exports, hence this
ban has been a big blow, particularly in the apple sector, where 90% were exported to Russia. The expected loss for the
cancellation of the CIS FTA for the remainder of 2014 is reported to be some $31 million. Coming on top of the
estimated $90 million losses as a consequence of the fruit ban this has put the Moldovan economy in difficulty.
Moldovan Prime Minister, Iurie Leanca, pledged an unspecified amount of compensation from both state and foreign
sources to help farmers make up for lost revenue, as well as assistance for the rescheduling of bank loans, and payment
of gas and electricity bills. Air Moldova is due to start distributing apples and other fruit to passengers, while the
government has allocated some $1.44 million to provide apples to kindergartens, public schools and the army.
Moldovan canning companies also reportedly agreed to purchase more fruit. Moldova is in talks with the Russians to try
and solve the issue and it is also actively looking for new markets. While these measures from Russia were expected,
Moldova had hoped that much of its banned fruit could enter the EU market. However, since Moscow's decision to
block imports of many EU agricultural products, as a consequence of sanctions placed on Russia, the EU market is
saturated with fruit and vegetables leaving little space for extra Moldovan produce.
With Brussels also having no extra money to help compensate the farmer's losses, several credit/finance agreements are
being negotiated with some Member States including Poland, and Denmark who has donated €4 million to modernise
the agriculture sector. Chisinau is also strengthening ties with other states such as Turkey and Qatar. On 12 September
2014 an FTA was signed with Turkey. In August a Strategic Partnership was signed with Qatar. Trade with Belarus has
also been boosted. Belarus, a Fellow Customs Union member has refused to join Russia's ban on Moldova, rather
choosing to increase trade. Following Russia's fruit ban the export of plums and apples to Belarus has significantly
increased. It is widely predicted much of this will be re-exported to Russia. Furthermore, on 24-25 September, Belarus
President Alexander Lukashenko headed a delegation to Moldova, where agreements worth $50 million were signed.
Moldova pays one of the highest prices in Europe for gas, $380 per 1.000 cubic meters. Hence the recent completion of
the first phase of the Unheni-Iasi natural gas inter-connector from Romania to Moldova is good news. While initially it is
expected to transport only some 50 million cubic metres of gas annually, which represents only 5% of Moldova's gas
needs, it breaks the monopoly that Russia's Gazprom has over Moldova and integrates Moldova into the European 
gas market. Yet to make a real difference it needs to be rapidly completed, as it could have an annual capacity of some
1.5 bcm which would cover all of Moldova's needs. The second phase is the construction of compressor station in
Romania, and the extension of the pipeline from Ungheni to Chisinau. 
Dealing with Transnistria
Transnistria is a narrow strip of Moldova bordering Ukraine. The 'five plus two' settlement talks (Moldova, Russia,
Ukraine, Transnistria, OSCE & US and EU as observers), are far from delivering a result and as a consequence of the
Russia-Ukraine crisis, there has been no meeting since the Spring of 2014. On 1 August, the Ukrainian security services
reinforced controls at the Transnistrian segment of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, making Transnistrians feel further
isolated. Moldova's leadership tries to maintain a constructive approach with the Transnistrian authorities, taking steps
that they hope will ultimately lead to the reintegration of Transnistria with Moldova. This has included actively
supporting confidence-building measures, and allowing Transnistria to temporarily trade with the EU as part of
Moldova's Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) regime. This has most recently included supporting caviar farms, with
the first international sales taking place this year. Furthermore, following Moldova's visa free regime with the EU, there
has been in a significant increase in demands from Tranisnistrians for Moldovan passports.
It would have been in Transnistria's interests to accept the DCFTA, given that about 70% of goods produced go to the
right bank of the Dniester River (Moldova) and onwards to the EU, while only about 18% go to Russia. However, their
dependence on Russia, including financially, makes such an option almost impossible. While Transnistria has been
granted an extension of the ATPs until 2015, once this ends it is likely that anti-EU sentiment will grow unless an
alternative way is found for trade with EU, thereby increasing tensions with Chisinau. On 16 April 2014, shortly after the
annexation of Crimea, the Transnistrian authorities voted in the Transnistrian Parliament to join Russia. A declaration was
adopted, motivated by the 2006 referendum in which 97% of voters in Transnistria voted to join Russia, which was
actually put on hold by the Russian authorities. While Russia has been happy with the status quo as it allows Russia to
keep a tight control over Moldova's actions, it is not cheap. It is estimated that Russia's financial support amounts to
some $1 billion every year. Since the beginning of 2014 Moscow has been increasingly pushing the "Federation Model"
which Chisinau firmly rejects. It considers federalisation to be contrary to its interests, and viewed as tool to allow
Moscow a long-term influence over Moldova, including related to foreign policy decisions.
PROSPECTS
The next few months will be very challenging for Moldova with internal and external developments continuing to shape
Moldova's future. Not only will Chisinau need to move ahead with the difficult and expensive implementation of the
DCFTA, the ruling coalition simultaneously needs to campaign for the elections with very importantly, a united front.
Moscow timed the bans to weaken support for the government and its EU ambitions ahead of the elections. Russia may
take further steps including further trade and labour market restrictions, as well as measures to provoke instability in
Gagauzia and Transnistria. Moscow may also try to further pressurise its Customs Union partners, Kazakhstan and
Belarus to stop trading with Moldova, although so far both countries have rejected this.
Events in Ukraine will continue to impact on Moldova. The decision to postpone the implementation of the DCFTA until
2016 undermined Moldova's efforts to convince Transnistria that becoming part of its DCFTA would be in their benefit
as they would find themselves caught in the middle of a regional free trade zone with the EU. The fact that Russia is now
part of Ukraine's DCFTA talks has also set a bad precedent as it gives the impression that Moscow has a say in the
foreign policy choices of a sovereign state. Moreover, where Russia's military intervention into Ukraine will finally end
is of significant importance to Moldova. An effort by Moscow to create a corridor between Donetsk and Ukraine's
border with Transnistria would be a significant security threat, as it would allow Russia to freely move its military
personal and equipment. While this would require Russia occupying a number of Ukrainian towns in the Southeast of
the country and would therefore seem unlikely, recent events have taught us to expect the unexpected. 
The Moldovan authorities, in cooperation with the EU, should devise an effective communication strategy to better
inform society about the benefits of the AA/DCFTA to dispel the myths being spread by Moscow. The government has
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begun to extend its outreach, organising town hall meetings in towns and villages across the country, but much more
needs to be done including creative ideas such as using famous people to sell the EU in order to win hearts and minds.
The outcome of the November election is crucial. If the current government is unable to hold on to power and the
Communists return to office a change of policy is almost certain. However, while Voronin has condemned the
government's policy as hostile to Russia stating "we cannot lose our partner and restrict our possibilities for
development" at the same time, Russia's annexation of Crimea created a rift with Voronin, as the Communists are
staunch supporters of territorial integrity. Furthermore, in the past Voronin has said the Communists would back all the
initiatives aimed at bringing Moldova closer to the EU. A fan of 'balancing' it is possible that the EU process would
continue although at a slower and inconsistent pace with the DCFTA possibly frozen. If the ruling coalition returns to
power, they have pledged to drive ahead with reforms in the run up to the Riga EaP Summit in May 2015. 
What can the EU do?
Moldova's successful European integration and modernisation hinges on two things: Chisinau's ability to tackle difficult
issues such as corruption and a compromised judiciary and the EU's ability to adequately support it. While numerous
senior EU officials have visited Moldova during the past year offering words of support and solidarity, this needs to be
transformed into resolute commitment. Requests from Chisinau, most recently asking the EU to send a special mission
to support judicial reform should be immediately accepted. Member State parliaments should rapidly ratify Moldova's
AA, while further steps should be taken to help Moldova strengthen its energy security. The EU's public diplomacy
should also be extended with particular attention to rural areas and Russian-speaking cities. The EU also needs to further
differentiate between those EaP countries such as Moldova, that are already implementing their agreements and those
that are lagging behind.
Despite the readiness of several Member States including, Romania, Poland, and the Baltic States to give Moldova a
membership perspective others such as Germany insist it should be done on a step-by-step basis. By failing to offer
Moldova such a perspective the EU is removing the most important instrument for bringing about reform and
democratic change. It leaves Moldova in a climate of uncertainty, which is a prerequisite of instability.
Moldova is contemplating throwing down the gauntlet by submitting a membership application at the Riga EaP Summit.
Several Member States have advised Moldova not to do this, stating the time is not right. Yet it is unlikely that the time
would ever be right. Today's EaP lacks a longer-term perspective which is unhelpful. If the EaP is to deliver a success
story, it needs to clarify its current ambiguous position over what is at the end of the EaP road. The Riga Summit should
provide roadmap for those countries that want closer ties – a robust package that goes beyond association.
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